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In the wake of cases challenging the scope of the Federal 
Trade Commission’s authority and its role in regulating 
cybersecurity, this Note considers the centrality of the FTC as 
a protector of consumer data. It broadly examines the current 
state of cybersecurity regulation and the need for a uniform 
national regime to protect consumer data. In considering 
different methods for realizing such federal oversight, this 
Note examines legislative and administrative options. Tracing 
the development of both highlights their shortcomings and 
reveals a potential solution. In the face of concerning legislative 
movement and uncertainty surrounding the FTC’s current 
enforcement philosophy, this Note endorses the employment of 
the FTC’s rarely used, but highly effective, rulemaking 
authority as a tool to complement and enhance its adjudicative 
enforcement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The growing connectivity of the world and the deepening 
reliance on digital platforms give rise to many new threats.1 
As inexpensive electronic storage has grown more available, 
the volume of data created and stored has exploded.2 This 
presents a growing security risk, as the value of that data 
invites theft.3 Indeed, since the rise of inexpensive electronic 
storage, cyberattacks and data breaches have increased 
dramatically in frequency and magnitude.4  
This Note examines potential methods of addressing this 
issue. Specifically, it highlights the need for federal 
 
1 See SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 5 (2018), 
https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-23-
2018-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/367P-PJJV]; see also Martin Giles, Six Cyber 
Threats to Really Worry About in 2018, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609641/six-cyber-threats-to-really-
worry-about-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/9QX7-Q24F].  
2 See MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE AGE OF ANALYTICS: COMPETING IN A 





3 See generally Taylor Armerding, The 18 Biggest Data Breaches of the 
21st Century, CSO (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-
breaches-of-the-21st-century.html [https://perma.cc/887Z-PWQ2]. 
4 See PONEMON INST., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL 
OVERVIEW 3, 23 (2018). https://databreachcalculator.mybluemix.net/assets/ 
2018_Global_Cost_of_a_Data_Breach_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D7B-
WFM6]. 
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regulation, explores how such a regulatory scheme may be 
feasibly implemented, and outlines the form such regulation 
should take.  
In the wake of cases challenging the role of the Federal 
Trade Commission (the “FTC” or “Commission”) and the scope 
of its authority in regulating cybersecurity, this Note 
considers the centrality of the FTC as a protector of consumer 
data. It also endorses the use of the FTC’s rarely exercised, 
but highly effective, rulemaking authority as a tool to 
complement and enhance its adjudicative enforcement.  
Part II offers a brief overview of the current state of 
regulation and reveals the need for federal intervention. It 
discusses the duplicative and inconsistent state regulations 
and exposes the gap left by the existing federal regulations, 
which are largely industry-specific and leave vast amounts of 
data unprotected. It then explores the legislative and 
administrative avenues available for federal regulation. 
Tracing the stagnant, years-long process of passing 
cybersecurity legislation, this Note demonstrates the need to 
pursue an alternative path for federal regulation. As large 
technology companies exercise their political muscle to lobby 
for regulation themselves,5 this Note cautions against 
premature celebration and investigates their intentions. Like 
the lobbying of tobacco companies in the 1960s, such efforts 
may be thinly veiled attempts to preempt more meaningful 
regulation.6  
Looking to the administrative avenue of federal regulation, 
this Note examines the extent to which various agencies 
regulate cybersecurity and identifies the gap that has allowed 
the most recent, well-publicized data breaches to occur. It 
 
5 See infra Section II.A. 
6 When faced with the prospect of unfavorable regulations, Big Tobacco 
made concerted efforts to preempt them by advancing and supporting their 
own, more palatable, federal laws. See Elizabeth Drew, The Quiet Victory of 
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then discusses the unique position of the FTC and why it is 
best situated to fill this gap. 
Part III provides an in-depth look at the FTC’s role as a 
cybersecurity regulator. It briefly surveys the Commission’s 
history of enforcement and summarizes two recent cases, FTC 
v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.7 and LabMD, Inc. v. FTC,8 
which challenged—and, in their resolution, somewhat 
crystallized—the scope of the FTC’s authority to regulate 
cybersecurity. Reviewing this history reveals the drawbacks 
of enforcement through adjudication. In response, this Note 
considers how to overcome these weaknesses and how the FTC 
can complement its enforcement efforts with other available 
tools to optimize its overall effectiveness. 
Part III then proposes the FTC invoke its relatively 
dormant rulemaking authority. Promulgating a rule would 
serve as notice to all companies and give teeth to any 
subsequent adjudication by allowing the FTC to seek 
meaningful penalties. There is, however, good reason the FTC 
has not tried using this authority yet, and this Note outlines 
the unique obstacles presented by the particularly convoluted 
procedure the FTC would be subject to. Revisiting Congress’s 
purpose in imposing these procedural requirements, this Note 
argues that Congress should allow a specific exception so the 
FTC can address the growing threat of cyberattacks, as it did 
with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, the 
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information rule, and the 
Health Breach Notification Rule.9 
Part IV offers a path forward in light of the aforementioned 
obstacles. Amid calls for legislation, which carries the risk of 
overvaluing the interests of large companies, Congress can 
instead grant streamlined rulemaking authority to the FTC. 
The FTC can establish rules that both protect consumers and 
 
7 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
8 LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018). 
9 These rules were passed after Congress allowed specific exceptions 
for the FTC to use a streamlined rulemaking process. See Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2018); Privacy of Consumer 
Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2018); Health Breach Notification 
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 318 (2018). 
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complement its adjudicative efforts. This solution fills the gap 
in current regulation while sidestepping the pitfalls of other 
approaches. 
II. AVENUES TO FEDERAL REGULATION 
Currently, state privacy laws provide the most 
comprehensive domestic regulation of American consumers’ 
data, but federal action is necessary. While Congress has 
failed to enact sweeping legislation governing all businesses 
that collect consumer data,10 state governments have acted to 
protect their residents.11 Since Alabama and South Dakota 
passed laws last year, all fifty states, together with the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the United 
States Virgin Islands, have passed data breach notification 
laws.12 
These state laws afford some protection to consumers, but 
they simply cannot provide the simplicity and 
comprehensiveness of federal regulation.13 Indeed, the 
current legal landscape is a patchwork quilt of varying 
definitions and requirements. The lack of uniformity creates 
a costly headache for companies trying to ensure 
compliance.14 As it stands, the state laws in effect are far from 
transposed copies of the same legislation. They differ in their 
 
10 See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection 
and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection 
[https://perma.cc/CRD2-7GMN]. 
11 See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/A8V8-LRHA]. 
12 See id.  
13 See generally Jacqueline May Tom, Note, A Simple Compromise: The 
Need for a Federal Data Breach Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1569, 1571 (2010). 
14 See, e.g., Kate Fazzini, Goldman’s Top Cybersecurity Official 
Complains About Patchwork of Laws, Says He Spends Too Much Time 
Talking to Regulators, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.cnbc. 
com/2018/12/11/goldman-sachs-cisoandy-ozment-complains-about-
patchwork-of-laws.html [https://perma.cc/HE6F-9WKQ].  
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definition of what constitutes sensitive personal information; 
what qualifies as a breach; when, to whom, and how disclosure 
is required; and whether any exceptions or safe harbors 
exist.15 Companies can conservatively comply with all state 
statutes, but the resulting over-compliance is costly and may 
lead to reputational harm and a competitive disadvantage.16 
Complying with different laws also requires companies to 
keep abreast of all the applicable laws and amendments of 
every state, each having its own variations.17 This requires a 
great deal of time and effort and “[i]n most cases, looking up 
each of the . . . statutes one by one is the only way to fully 
understand the differences.”18 
Technology will inevitably continue to evolve, but laws 
surrounding breaches need not change substantially in 
response to justify the current patchwork of conflicting state 
laws. Aside from updating what constitutes a breach or 
incident, details like the time period for notification, who 
companies must report them to, and what constitutes 
personally identifiable information should not require 
frequent adjustments. A unified federal regulatory scheme 
could resolve many of the issues created by the existing 
regime. Such a federal cybersecurity regime could be created 
through legislation, administrative action, or some 
combination of the two.  
A. Legislative Avenue 
While the United States has been slow to establish a 
national data privacy regime, many other countries and 
regions have implemented their own. The governments of 
Canada, Australia, and the European Union (“EU”) have all 
 
15 See generally PERKINS COIE, SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION CHART 
(June 2018), https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/1/9/v2/197566/ 
Security-Breach-Notification-Law-Chart-June-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
GPH3-WA5P].  
16 See Tom, supra note 13, at 1571. 
17 See id. at 1570. 
18 Id. 
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enacted comprehensive data privacy legislation.19 In fact, the 
EU regulation smoothly replaced its own patchwork of 
conventions, directives, treaties, and individual European 
country rules,20 offering a model to the United States. As a 
result, companies quickly responded to ensure compliance.21 
While companies have loudly lamented the resulting cost,22 
according to the 2018 Thales Data Threat Report, seventy-
four percent of respondents in the United States and sixty-
four percent around the world feel that adhering to 
compliance standards is a “very” or “extremely” effective way 
to keep sensitive data secure.23 Besides, while the upfront 
costs may be apparent, compliance is very likely a cost-saver 
in the long run. Considering more than half of U.S. businesses 
 
19 See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 
S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.); Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 
2017 (Cth) (Austl.); Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
20  See Christina Glon, Data Protection in the European Union: A Closer 
Look at the Current Patchwork of Data Protection Laws and the Proposed 
Reform That Could Replace Them All, 42 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 471, 472 
(2014). 
21 See Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe 
World’s Leading Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/technology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/34PC-T8WG] (“The notices are flooding people’s inboxes 
en masse, from large technology companies . . . . ‘Here is an update to our 
privacy policy,’ they say. . . . All are acting because the European Union on 
Friday enacts the world’s toughest rules to protect people’s online data.”). 
22 See Jeremy Kahn, Stephanie Bodoni & Stefan Nicola, It’ll Cost 
Billions for Companies to Comply with Europe’s New Data Law, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-03-22/it-ll-cost-billions-for-companies-to-comply-with-
europe-s-new-data-law (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
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experienced a cyberattack in 2017 alone24 and the average 
cost of a breach to companies is $3.86 million,25 the 
investment in cybersecurity—whether mandated or not—may 
more than pay for itself. This is not to mention the avoided 
costs of penalties added by new legislation or the more 
insidious costs borne by consumers who are exposed to 
identity theft. A recent Department of Justice (“DOJ”) study 
found that identity theft costs each victim an average of 
$1343, including direct financial loss and indirect costs such 
as legal fees and overdraft charges.26 
Yet, regulation has stalled in the United States at the 
federal level. Although Congress passed laws to protect 
financial information,27 healthcare information,28 and 
infrastructure,29 broad regulation setting a baseline for all 
companies that process personal data has yet to be enacted.30 
This is not for lack of effort. For over a decade, Congress has 
been actively trying to pass bills to protect consumer data. As 
early as 2005, there were “at least seven House and Senate 
committees working on federal legislation directly addressing 
what organizations should do when individuals’ personal and 
private data has been illegally accessed.”31 Ultimately, these 
 
24 See Press Release, Munich RE, Half of U.S. Businesses Have Been 
Hacked (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.munichre.com/HSB/business-hacked-
survey-2017/index.html [https://perma.cc/23VG-5Z3U]. 
25 PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 3. 
26 ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 
2014, at 6 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4WXE-BMEC]. 
27 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501–510, 113 
Stat. 1338, 1436–45 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 
(2012)). 
28 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 221, 110 Stat. 1936, 2009–11 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7e (2012)). 
29 See generally Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-347, §§ 301–305, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946–61. 
30 See O’Connor, supra note 10; see also Tom, supra note 13, at 1752. 
31 Samuel Lee, Note, Breach Notification Laws: Notification 
Requirements and Data Safeguarding Now Apply to Everyone, Including 
Entrepreneurs, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 125, 136 n.63 (2006) (citing 
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. 
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early bills were “mired down in committees by turf wars and 
intense lobbying.”32 Similar bills have been introduced almost 
every year since, all suffering the same fate.33  
On one hand, the growing number of state and 
international cybersecurity regulations provide a model for 
Congress.34 The burden of complying with the increasingly 
complex regulations could also encourage companies to 
embrace a national standard. However, the proliferation of 
some stricter state standards—such as the California 
Consumer Privacy Act35—has prompted large tech companies 
to begin lobbying Congress for weaker privacy regulations. 
The goal of the tech giants, it seems, is to nullify these stricter 
 
(2005); Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 1326, 109th Cong. (2005); Data 
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005); Information 
Protection and Security Act, S. 500, 109th Cong. (2005); Information 
Protection and Security Act, H.R. 1080, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data 
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005); Consumer Data 
Notification and Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3140, 109th Cong. (2005)).  
32 Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse 
of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 157 (2006). 
33 See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 5388, 115th Cong. 
(2018); Data Security and Breach Notification Act, S. 2179, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 580, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. 
(2015); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4400, 113th Cong. (2014); 
Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2014, S. 1976, 113th Cong. 
(2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2013, S. 1193, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2012, S. 3333, 
112th Cong. (2012); Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2011, H.R. 1841, 
112th Cong. (2011).  
34 See Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving 
Efficiency Through a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and 
Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 66 (2015); see also 
America Should Borrow from Europe’s Data-Privacy Law, ECONOMIST (Apr. 
5, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/05/america-should-
borrow-from-europes-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/GET5-ZUEK]. 
35 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); 
see also Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect 
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regulations and prevent them from becoming the de facto 
national standard.36  
This is not the first time large businesses have attempted 
to escape impending safety standards by advocating for 
legislation on their own terms. In the 1960s, the tobacco 
industry, facing the prospect of federal regulation, made 
similar efforts to endorse tobacco-related legislation as a way 
to forestall heightened consumer protection requirements.37 
During that time, the FTC had recommended to Congress that 
consumers should be alerted of the new proven risks of 
smoking cigarettes.38 Specifically, it recommended that all 
packages be labeled “Caution: Cigarette Smoking Is 
Dangerous to Health. It May Cause Death from Cancer and 
Other Diseases.”39 Initially, the tobacco industry invested 
heavily in lobbying to prevent such a warning label 
requirement.40 But under the guidance of Abe Fortas, a future 
Supreme Court justice, and former Kentucky governor Earle 
Clements, the industry dramatically altered its strategy.41 
The tobacco makers began voluntarily requesting 
regulation—just as tech companies are today.42 For the 
tobacco industry, the strategy proved successful. Congress 
passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
 
36 See Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on 
Its Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/tech-industry-federal-
privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/9G7K-P2BL] (“In recent months, 
Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft and others have aggressively lobbied 
officials in the Trump administration and elsewhere to start outlining a 
federal privacy law, according to administration officials and the companies. 
The law would have a dual purpose, they said: It would overrule the 
California law and instead put into place a kinder set of rules that would 
give the companies wide leeway over how personal digital information was 
handled.”). 
37 See Drew, supra note 6. 
38 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labelling of Cigarettes in 
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8303, 8324 (July 
2, 1964). 
39 Id. at 8326. 
40 See Drew, supra note 6. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
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(FCLAA) of 1965, diluting the FTC’s recommendation.43 
Under the FCLAA, warning labels only had to read, “Caution: 
Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”44 This 
requirement was a step forward to be sure, but notably altered 
the FDA’s proposed language, which stated that smoking “is 
dangerous”, to say that it “may be hazardous” and expunged 
the words “death” and “cancer.” Significantly, this new federal 
law preempted all state laws, ensuring no stronger protections 
could be implemented by any state.45  
Much like the tech giants of today, tobacco makers were 
large economic engines that wielded significant political 
power thanks to generous campaign contributions and well-
funded lobbying campaigns.46 Now that California has passed 
legislation with strict data security requirements going into 
effect in 2020,47 Big Tech appears to be following Big Tobacco’s 
playbook. Companies like Google and Facebook are 
scrambling to get palatable federal legislation passed that will 
preempt state laws—including California’s stricter 
standards.48 These federal bills may promise increased 
consumer protection, but they will instead represent a delay 
to, or even a step back from, the progress made by states.  
Past attempts at federal regulation of consumer data 
storage encountered political gridlock and inaction, while new 
efforts appear to be engineered by self-interested technology 
firms seeking to undercut the progress of newly-minted state 
laws—to the detriment of consumers. For consumers, the talk 
of federal legislative action does not necessarily translate to 
greater protection. However, the authority afforded to federal 
administrative agencies by existing mandates may provide 
another way to fill the void. 
 
43 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2012)). 
44 See id. § 4. 
45 See id. § 5(a)–(b); see also Drew, supra note 6. 
46 See Drew, supra note 6. 
47 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (West 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); 
see also Wakabayashi, supra note 35.  
48 See Kang, supra note 36. 
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B. Administrative Agency Avenue 
In line with the aforementioned industry-specific 
legislation that has passed through Congress,49 various 
agencies have the authority to regulate data privacy within 
their respective spheres. Student data are governed by the 
Department of Education;50 health data are governed by the 
Department of Health & Human Services;51 banking data are 
governed by federal banking agencies such as the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation;52 and data of those who trade in securities 
markets are governed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).53 The data security architecture of the 
federal government is complicated, but each agency is legally 
responsible for its own cybersecurity,54 and agency 
compliance is primarily monitored by the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”).55  
 
49 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.  
50 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).  
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(2012).  
52 See generally Financial Services and Cybersecurity: The Federal 
Role, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport. 
com/reports/R44429.html [https://perma.cc/52WD-RWWE]. 
53 See 17 C.F.R. § 248 (2019).  
54 See 44 U.S.C § 3554 (2012). 
55 While the specific oversight and monitoring roles are a complex web 
of responsibilities, the cybersecurity of the federal government itself is 
handled largely by the DHS (with support from internal DHS entities such 
as the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center and 
the new Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, with external 
support from the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and National Security Agency) according to standards developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (within the Department of 
Commerce) and in line with policies promulgated by the Office of 
Management and Budget. See KATE CHARLET, HARV. KENNEDY SCHOOL 
BELFER CTR FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL 
CYBERSECURITY 8, 10–13 (2018), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/files/publication/Understanding%20Federal%20Cybersecurity
%2004-2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/G93J-QRAK]; see also Olivia Beavers, 
Trump Signs Bill Cementing Cybersecurity Agency at DHS, HILL (Nov. 16, 
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Recent activity in the area gives the impression that the 
federal government is expanding the authority of agencies to 
monitor civilian cybersecurity. In fact, President Trump 
recently signed a bill that bolsters the DHS’s role in data 
security.56 However, while this new law demonstrates the 
increased attention to and prioritization of the federal 
government’s role in cybersecurity, it follows the pattern of 
sector-specific regulation, limiting its application primarily to 
government infrastructure.57 It does nothing, by contrast, to 
advance the security of consumer data held by private 
institutions. In 2017, government data was the subject of only 
4.7% of breaches, whereas business data accounted for 55.1% 
of breaches.58 Additionally, the healthcare and banking 
industries—subject to the sector-specific regulations— 
account for only 23.7% and 8.5% of breaches, respectively.59 
This difference may be evidence of the effectiveness of current 
regulations, or distortions caused by under-reporting, but 
such a determination would require further exploration 
beyond the scope of this Note. This Note’s primary concern is 
addressing the glaring issue of business sector breaches.  
The SEC is working to address this issue, but its focus is 
limited to “federal securities laws as they apply to public 
operating companies.”60 Regulation of public companies 
satisfies some of the need for federal protection of consumer 
data, but it is important to remember that only 3600 firms 




56 See Beavers, supra note 55. 
57 See id. 
58 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2017 ANNUAL DATA BREACH YEAR-END 




60 Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company 
Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. 8165, 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 229, 249). 
61  Editorial, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/ 
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number represents just a fraction of a percent of the nearly 
twenty-eight million firms operating in the United States.62 
Unless the remainder fall under the scope of industry-specific 
regulations, they are not subject to any federal oversight, 
leaving a large swath of consumer data unprotected. The FTC, 
with its broad scope and general mission of consumer 
protection,63 is uniquely well-situated to regulate data 
security for all the firms otherwise untouched by federal 
regulation.  
III. THE FTC’S ROLE AS CYBERSECURITY 
REGULATOR 
Compared to Congress, the FTC is better positioned to offer 
meaningful protection to consumer data. Although consumers 
would stand to benefit from such protection, large companies 
facing increased compliance costs have greater incentives to 
take a political stand against meaningful protection and have 
the resources to do so. In other words, the loss to an individual 
consumer does not justify a lobbying campaign, while the 
potential compliance costs to private companies might.  
Though the individual loss to each victim may not inspire 
political action, it can be quite considerable in the aggregate. 
In fact, even if increased cybersecurity measures added 
hundreds of millions of dollars in compliance costs for 
companies, it would still be dwarfed by the costs consumers 
bear when their personal information is exposed. These costs 
are often latent and hard to estimate, but the DOJ’s recent 
report on identity theft concluded that 64.9% of the 17,576,200 
victims of identity theft in 2014 suffered financial losses of 
greater than $1, with an average loss of $1343.64 By these 
numbers, the cost to consumers in 2014 alone exceeded $15 
 
2018-04-09/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-gone (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
62 QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/US/SBO001212#SBO001212 [https://perma.cc/6NWA-
HLU2]. 
63 See About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc [https://perma.cc/Y4BT-N7YV]. 
64 HARRELL, supra note 26, at 6. 
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billion.65 While not all identity theft is directly caused by data 
breaches, it is the motivation for most breaches.66 With over 
3.3 billion records compromised in the first half of 2018 
alone,67 if even a fraction of these resulted in financial loss 
from identity theft (at an average cost of $1343 per victim), 
the total cost to consumers would be astronomical.  
Compounding their powerlessness, victims are politically 
disorganized strangers, while firms, especially large 
technology firms, are much more concentrated. This 
concentration allows companies to lobby much more 
effectively.68 Put simply, there is no organized group of “Data 
Breach Victims” clamoring for reform. An enterprising private 
attorney may offer some organization by bringing a class 
action, duly incentivized by the potential contingency fee to be 
earned through aggregating claims. However, even if she 
overcomes the hurdles of winning such a case, the final 
damages may make for a very wealthy attorney but would 
barely effect the bottom line of a company like Facebook.  
The FTC helps consumers cut through this Gordian knot. 
By representing all consumers, agency action helps even the 
playing field between individuals and corporations and acts as 
a concentrated conduit for their interests. Additionally, as an 
executive branch agency, it enjoys an extra degree of 
insulation from the interests that affect legislative decision-
making.  
Generally speaking, the FTC advances its mission of 
protecting consumers and competition by enforcing a variety 
of related laws. Before the 1970s, the FTC relied on its 
authority to bring actions against parties that violated the 
 
65 Id. at 7. 
66 See Data Breaches Compromised 3.3 Billion Records in First Half of 




68 See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 55 (2018).  
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Federal Trade Commission Act, the Clayton Act, or other 
consumer protection laws.69 
In the early 1970s, however, the FTC began promulgating 
rules, and its authority to do so was upheld by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.70 
Congress soon after passed two laws that delineated and 
circumscribed the FTC’s rulemaking ability, the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act of 197571 and the Federal Trade Commission 
Improvements Act of 1980.72 These laws imposed additional 
procedures (collectively the “Magnuson-Moss Procedures”) 
that complicated the FTC’s rulemaking process and “go far 
beyond the relatively streamlined notice-and-comment 
procedures mandated in Section 553 of the [Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”)] to which most agencies are 
subject.”73 FTC rulemaking dramatically slowed following the 
passage of the Magnuson-Moss Procedures, but Congress has 
occasionally provided limited statutory authorization for the 
FTC to use the APA rulemaking procedures to issue specific 
rules.74 
On three occasions, Congress has permitted the FTC to use 
APA rulemaking procedures to address prevalent online 
privacy and cybersecurity issues—children’s privacy online, 
privacy of consumer financial data, and health data 
 
69 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative 
and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (July 2008) 
[hereinafter A Brief Overview], https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/42YY-TGAY].  
70 See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
71 See Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183, 1293 (1975) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012)). 
72 See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-252, §§ 7–12, 15, 21, 94 Stat. 374, 376–80, 388–90, 393–96 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C). 
73 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the “Mossified” Procedures for 
FTC Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979, 1982 (2015).  
74 See id. 
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breaches.75 However, without a broader Congressional 
mandate, rulemaking for all other categories of consumer data 
is subject to the Magnuson-Moss Procedures.76 Though the 
FTC has not issued any rules concerning this large swath of 
data, it has brought enforcement actions under section 5 of the 
1914 FTC Act against companies that have lost consumer 
data.77 This Section briefly traces the development of the 
FTC’s enforcement practices and then looks at the potential of 
rulemaking to complement the FTC’s current efforts. 
A. Adjudication 
The FTC began policing corporate cybersecurity practices 
in 2002.78 Though the 1914 FTC Act unsurprisingly makes no 
mention of cybersecurity, section 5 of the Act—prohibiting 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce”79—was intended to be interpreted broadly, 
according to the statute’s legislative history and subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.80 In the early 2000s, the FTC 
 
75 See Regulation of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in 
Connection with Collection and Use of Personal Information from and About 
Children on the Internet, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (2012); see also 
Rulemaking, 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(3) (2012); Temporary Breach Notification 
Requirement for Vendors of Personal Health Records and Other Non-
HIPAA Covered Entities, 42 U.S.C. § 17937(g)(1) (2012).  
76 Requiring much more than simple notice and comment, the 
Magnuson-Moss Procedures mandate a much more laborious process. For a 
good overview, see Lubbers, supra note 73, at 1982–84.  





78 See id.; see also William R. Denny, Cybersecurity as an Unfair 
Practice: FTC Enforcement Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, BUS. L. TODAY, 
June 2016, at 2, 2, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publications/blt/2016/06/cyber-center-denny-201606.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/F2SP-RLLN]. 
79 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
80 See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 
(1972). See generally Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of 
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brought a number of actions against companies that failed to 
protect consumer data.81 Early actions were based on the 
premise that, by making false representations about data 
security, companies were engaging in deceptive business 
practices.82 Later actions were based on claims that 
companies’ cybersecurity practices were “unfair.”83  
All actions until 2012 resulted in consent decrees,84 
whereby companies agreed to certain terms without admitting 
guilt.85 Though some companies questioned the FTC’s 
authority to regulate cybersecurity, they all settled to avoid 
drawn out litigation—and the resulting legal costs, potential 
public exposure, and reputational harm.86 In 2012, however, 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp. (“Wyndham”) challenged the 
FTC’s authority in court. Following a series of hacks that 
exposed more than 600,000 records in Wyndham’s possession 
and resulted in $10.6 million in fraudulent charges, the FTC 
brought a suit alleging unfair cybersecurity practices.87 The 
 
Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. 
REV. 227 (1980). 
81 See FTC, supra note 77, at 4; see also Cases Tagged with Data 
Security, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/terms/249?page=2 [https://perma.cc/7LSD-6X33]. 
82 See Julie Brill, Commissioner, FTC, On the Front Lines: The FTC’s 
Role in Data Security, Keynote Address Before the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies: “Stepping into the Fray: The Role of Independent 
Agencies in Cybersecurity” 3 (Sept. 17, 2014), (available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/582841/140
917csisspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5JE-RRBA]) (“The FTC’s data 
security enforcement actions initially focused on deception.”). 
83 See id. at 4.  
84 M. Sean Royall et al., The Third Circuit Upholds the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission’s Authority to Regulate Cybersecurity, GIBSON DUNN 
(Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.gibsondunn.com/the-third-circuit-upholds-the-
u-s-federal-trade-commissions-authority-to-regulate-cybersecurity/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z8EJ-3ZXM].  
85 Consent decrees are settlements with the FTC and do not include 
any findings made by a court. See Consent Decree, WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2004). 
86 Denny, supra note 78.  
87 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2015); 
see also Denny, supra note 78. 
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district court denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss, but 
Wyndham appealed the question of whether the “unfairness” 
prong of section 5 applied to cybersecurity.88 The Third Circuit 
held that it did,89 judicially affirming the FTC’s authority. 
As the FTC worked its way to a final settlement with 
Wyndham, another company, LabMD, Inc. (“LabMD”), 
commenced its own challenge to another FTC attempt at 
cybersecurity enforcement. LabMD, a clinical testing 
laboratory, stored personal information for nearly one million 
consumers.90 In 2013, the FTC filed an Administrative 
Complaint identifying two “security incidents” and charged 
LabMD with “failure to employ reasonable and appropriate 
measures to prevent unauthorized access to personal 
information, including dates of birth, [Social Security 
numbers], medical test codes, and health information” that 
“caused, or is likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers 
that is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
competition and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers.”91 
The FTC alleged that these failures amounted to unfair 
business practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.92  
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissed the 
complaint, finding that the FTC failed to meet its burden of 
proving the alleged conduct caused or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers.93 The judge stated, “[a]t best, 
Complaint Counsel has proven the ‘possibility’ of harm, but 
not any ‘probability’ or likelihood of harm” and that 
“[f]undamental fairness dictates that demonstrating actual or 
likely substantial consumer injury under Section 5(n) requires 
proof of more than the hypothetical or theoretical harm that 
has been submitted by the government in this case.”94 
 
88 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 242.  
89 Id. at 249. 
90 See Complaint at *2, In re LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2013 WL 
5232775 (Aug. 29, 2013). 
91 Id. at *4–5. 
92 Id. at *5. 
93 See Initial Decision at *13, In re LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2015 
WL 7575033 (Nov. 13, 2015). 
94 Id. at *14. 
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The FTC appealed this decision to its own commissioners, 
who unsurprisingly reversed and ruled in favor of the 
agency.95 The Commission vacated the ALJ’s decision and 
ordered LabMD to install a data-security program that met 
the FTC’s reasonableness standard.96 Up to this point, the 
FTC’s strategy of promoting security standards through 
enforcement actions appeared workable. However, the most 
recent development in the case has left the future efficacy of 
the FTC’s enforcement through adjudication in question.  
Following the Commission’s final order, LabMD sought 
judicial review of the order in the Eleventh Circuit. The 
Eleventh Circuit vacated the order, agreeing with LabMD’s 
argument that it was unenforceable.97 Notably, the court did 
not decide whether LabMD’s conduct constituted an unfair 
business practice, but merely assumed arguendo that it did.98 
Even with this assumption, the Court held the order—
“founded upon LabMD’s general negligent failure to act”—was 
unenforceable as it did not elucidate a specific act for LabMD 
to cease and desist.99 The Court reasoned that “the cease and 
desist order contains no prohibitions. It does not instruct 
LabMD to stop committing a specific act or practice. Rather, 
it commands LabMD to overhaul and replace its data-security 
program to meet an indeterminable standard of 
reasonableness. This command is unenforceable.”100 
This decision carries wide-ranging implications for the 
regulation of consumer data—potentially impacting the FTC’s 
future enforcement strategy. As mentioned, aside from the 
Wyndham and LabMD cases, the FTC has resolved dozens of 
 
95 See Opinion of the Commission, at *1, In re LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. No. 
9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (Jul. 28, 2016) (“[T]he Commission has concluded 
that LabMD’s data security practices were unreasonable and constitute an 
unfair act or practice that violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.”). 
96 Id. at *1–2. 
97 See LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). 
98 See id. at 1231. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1236. 
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data privacy issues with consent decrees.101 The Commission 
advertises these as providing notice to the private sector of 
compliance expectations.102 While the Commission appealed 
the ALJ’s dismissal, it argued, “the FTC has been consistent 
and clear about how it enforces Section 5 of the FTC Act 
against companies for their business practices related to the 
security of consumer data and, as a result, Respondent has 
received fair notice.”103 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
LabMD, finding the FTC’s order to be unenforceable, calls into 
question the validity of the Commission’s past enforcement 
actions—many of which employed language identical to the 
vacated LabMD order.104 It also provides the FTC with reason 
to reevaluate its enforcement philosophy and seek a less 
disputable method of giving notice to private companies. This 
opens the door for promulgating rules, as discussed below.  
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision may also increase pressure 
on Congress to enact federal legislation establishing a uniform 
national regime, or at least pass a mandate giving the FTC 
specific cybersecurity enforcement power. The decision also 
leaves several questions unresolved, including whether a data 
breach constitutes an unfair act or practice and whether it 
results in actionable harm under the FTC Act. This ambiguity 
opens future FTC enforcement to additional challenges. A 
Congressional mandate would bypass these issues by 
establishing independent authorization and could clearly 
define lost data as an injury. 
 
101 See FTC, supra note 77. 
102 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR 
BUSINESS 1 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-
language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KPX-QAJW] 
(“There’s another source of information about keeping sensitive data 
secure: the lessons learned from the more than 50 law enforcement actions 
the FTC has announced so far.”).  
103 See Complaint Counsel’s Response in Opposition to Respondent’s 
Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice and to Stay Administrative 
Proceedings at *20, In re LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2013 WL 6327988 
(Nov. 22, 2013). 
104 See, e.g., In re James B. Nutter & Co. F.T.C. No. C-4258, 2009 WL 
1818012 (June 12, 2009) (decision and order). 
  
756 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
B. Rulemaking 
In addition to bringing enforcement actions, the FTC has 
the authority to promulgate rules consistent with its 
mission.105 The FTC has used its rulemaking authority 
infrequently, however, since the passage of the Magnuson-
Moss Procedures.106 Still, despite the obstacles the FTC faces 
in promulgating rules, the current state of cybersecurity 
regulation may require the agency to dust off this dormant 
tool.  
The Wyndham and LabMD cases demonstrate some of the 
factors that hamper the FTC’s ability to effectively regulate 
through adjudication. Unlike in the field of children’s privacy, 
the FTC lacks the statutory authority to impose civil penalties 
for consumer privacy issues.107 As a result, first-time 
offenders often receive what Commissioner Rohit Chopra 
called a mere “slap on the wrist,”108 a characterization echoed 
by many observers.109 While Wyndham was technically a 
 
105 “[T]he Commission may use trade regulation rules to remedy unfair 
or deceptive practices that occur on an industry-wide basis.” A Brief 
Overview, supra note 69. 
106 See Lubbers, supra note 73, at 1989. 
107 See Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Is the FTC Powerful 
Enough to Be an Effective Privacy Cop? New Report Raises Questions, WASH. 





108 Opening Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra: Hearing on 
Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot., Product Safety, Ins., & Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. 1 (2018) (statement of Rohit 




109 See Brady Dale, FTC Slaps the Wrist of Tax Prep Service After 8,800 
Customers’ Data Breached, OBSERVER (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://observer.com/2017/08/ftc-taxslayer/ [https://perma.cc/MGF5-
WL4W]; Allison Grande, LabMD Gets Slap On Wrist In FTC Data Security 
Fight, LAW360 (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/518274 (on 
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“first-time offender”—having received no previous settlement 
with the FTC, the Third Circuit held that the company had 
fair notice,110 noting that the company had been hacked three 
times and, “after the second attack, it should have been 
painfully clear to Wyndham that a court could find its conduct 
failed the cost-benefit analysis.”111 However, waiting for 
multiple successive hacks before imposing penalties is a 
patently inefficient regulatory strategy. Alternatively, the 
FTC can seek civil penalties against a company that has 
violated a previously issued injunction or consent decree.112 
This solution is also imperfect—it effectively requires the FTC 
to bring two actions against any firm in order to penalize it. 
The infeasibility of this approach is compounded by the fact 
that even some of the FTC’s injunctions have been found 
unenforceable.113 
Despite this uphill battle, the FTC has continued to use its 
authority to issue consent decrees,114 which at least allows 
enforcement of civil penalties against second-time violators. 
For instance, some Senators believe Google’s recent data 
 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review); David Kravets, FTC Slaps 
Facebook’s Hand Over Privacy Deception, WIRED (Nov. 29, 2011), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/11/ftc-slaps-facebook-privacy/ [https://perma. 
cc/VT7X-Z4J4]; David Kravets, FTC Slaps Google’s Wrist in Search, Patent 
Probe, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/01/ftc-google-
patent-search-probe/ [https://perma.cc/PC8L-L84G]; Linda McGlasson, 
Reaction to TJX Settlement: “A Very Light Slap on the Wrist,” BANK INFO 
SECURITY (Mar. 28, 2008), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/reaction-to-
tjx-settlement-a-very-light-slap-on-wrist-a-793 [https://perma.cc/E6FE-
GX3H]. 
110 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
111 Id. at 256. 
112 See The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/enforcers [https://perma.cc/9772-F5Q9]. 
113 See LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). 
114 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Uber Agrees to 
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breach violates its 2011 consent decree with the FTC.115 
Because the previous consent decree constituted notice, the 
FTC may now seek civil penalties against Google if the agency 
finds a violation. However, the recent LabMD decision brings 
the efficacy of such consent decrees into question.  
If the FTC’s capacity to promulgate rules offers a potential 
solution to the notice problem, why has it not done so? A look 
at the history of FTC rulemaking offers some insight. 
1. History of the FTC’s Rulemaking Process 
For most of the FTC’s history, it relied solely on 
adjudicative enforcement. In 1973, however, the agency’s 
authority to promulgate rules survived its first judicial 
challenge.116 After the FTC’s rulemaking authority was 
upheld in the courts, Congress quickly grew tired of what it 
viewed as “the second most powerful legislature in 
Washington.”117 As the FTC zealously pursued initiatives in 
what is widely considered the agency’s activist era,118 
Congress sought to circumscribe the Commission’s 
rulemaking authority.119 To do so, Congress passed the 
Magnuson-Moss Act and Federal Trade Commission 
Improvements Act of 1980.120 These laws made it significantly 
more difficult for the FTC to promulgate rules by mandating 
additional rulemaking procedures—many of which afford 
 
115 Two Democrats Say Google+ Data Exposure May Violate FTC 
Consent Decree, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
google-congress/two-democrats-say-google-data-exposure-may-violate-ftc-
consent-decree-idUSL2N1X40SF [https://perma.cc/2JX9-V95Z]. 
116 See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC., 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
117 Financial Services and Products: The Role of the Federal Trade 
Commission in Protecting Customers—Part II: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 63 (2011) (testimony of Timothy J. 
Muris, Foundation Professor, George Mason University School of Law, and 
Of Counsel, O’Melveny & Myers LLP). 
118 See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE 
AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 73 (1982). 
119 See id. 
120 See supra Part III. 
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opponents of proposed regulations the opportunity to 
significantly impede the efforts.121 
The alternative rulemaking regime is the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”), which exclusively governed FTC 
rulemaking before the enactment of Magnuson-Moss and the 
FTC Improvement Act of 1980 and governs many of the 
rulemaking procedures used by other agencies.122 The APA 
provides for a considerably more streamlined notice-and-
comment process.123 Occasionally, Congress has passed 
legislation allowing the FTC to utilize the APA procedures in 
select circumstances.124 Recently, the FTC requested 
authority to use the APA process in promulgating 
cybersecurity rules.125 
2. Significance of Using APA Rulemaking Process  
No new rules have been initiated under the Magnuson-
Moss Procedures since they were further complicated by the 
FTC Improvements Act in 1980.126 The FTC has followed the 
 
121 Such procedures include, in many commonly-applicable 
circumstances, mandatory oral hearings upon request and a requirement 
that interested parties be granted opportunities for cross-examination. See 
generally 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012). 
122 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
123 See generally id.; see also Lubbers, supra note 73, at 1982. 
124 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012). 
125 See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: Oversight 
of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., 
Product Safety, Ins., & Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & 




126 See Lubbers, supra note 73, at 1989; see also Jon Leibowitz, 
Chairman, FTC, Remarks at the Association of National Advertisers 




3PRH]) (“The requirements to promulgate a rule under [the Magnuson-
Moss Act] are so onerous that the agency has not proposed a new 
[Magnuson-Moss Act] rule in 32 years. Thirty-two. For instance, under [the 
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procedures to amend previously promulgated rules, but it took 
the agency an average of 5.26 years to complete these 
amendments.127 For comparison, in the limited circumstances 
where Congress asked the FTC to make rules according to 
APA procedures, it took an average of 287.3 days—less than 
one year.128 It is particularly illustrative to consider the FTC’s 
promulgation of another privacy rule, the Financial Privacy 
Rule. When Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act—
which gives federal banking agencies authority to regulate 
financial data129—it asked the FTC to make a rule under the 
APA procedures.130 The FTC issued its notice of proposed 
rulemaking on March 1, 2000, and after receiving 640 
comments, issued its final rule on May 24, 2000—84 days 
later.131 
While the Magnuson-Moss Procedures have effectively 
frozen the FTC’s ability to promulgate rules, the APA offers a 
method for the FTC to develop rules benefiting consumers in 
the same way other agencies make their cybersecurity 
regulations. Congress need not grant the FTC broad 
legislative authority; it simply should allow the FTC to invoke 
APA procedures in this limited rulemaking context.  
IV. FOR BEST RESULTS, USE THE WHOLE 
TOOLKIT 
Implementing a simple solution to protect consumer data 
is far from easy, but using its various tools, the FTC is the 
best-positioned federal agency to provide a path forward. 
While there have been increasing calls for federal 
intervention, specific standards promulgated by Congress are 
 
Magnuson-Moss Act], if any member of the public requests it, the agency 
has to hold a hearing where interested persons have the right to examine, 
rebut, and cross-examine witnesses.”). 
127 Lubbers, supra note 73, at 1991. 
128 Id. at 1995. 
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). 
130 See id. § 6804(a)(3). 
131 See Lubbers, supra note 73, at 1993–94. 
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at risk of inadequately protecting consumers.132 Amidst these 
calls for legislation, rather than allowing the companies 
subject to the regulation to dictate its terms, Congress should 
look to the consumer protection experts at the FTC and afford 
them the ability to propose cybersecurity rules and receive 
comments. The FTC is an agency specifically designed to 
protect the interests of consumers who may otherwise lack the 
organizational capacity or financial incentive to do so alone. It 
also enjoys relative insulation from political pressure.133 
While the FTC may be the ideal vehicle for promulgating 
regulations that sufficiently protect consumers, it is 
hamstrung by procedural barriers.134 Given the FTC’s broad 
scope of authority, Congress may have had good reason to 
restrict its rulemaking ability. But by doing so, Congress has 
left consumers’ data vulnerable. Congress can lift these 
rulemaking restrictions for the limited purpose of allowing the 
FTC to address data security. It has done so in the past, 
allowing the Commission to utilize APA rulemaking 
mechanisms “for discrete topics such as children’s privacy, 
financial data security, and certain provisions of credit 
reporting.”135 Under this lightened procedural burden, the 
FTC would likely be able to establish a regulatory framework 
in a matter of months. Moreover, if such a congressional 
rulemaking mandate preempted state laws, it could eliminate 
the compliance headache for companies operating under 
inconsistent state laws without undercutting the progress 
made by the states to protect consumer data. Additionally, 
such a congressional mandate could formalize definitions of 
 
132 Large companies are already involved in designing the regulations 
to which they may be subject. See David Shepardson, Trump 
Administration Working on Consumer Data Privacy Policy, REUTERS (July 
27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet-privacy/trump-
administration-working-on-consumer-data-privacy-policy-
idUSKBN1KH2MK [https://perma.cc/SE6B-EM8T].  
133 See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent 
Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259–60 (1988) (noting that independent 
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harm and thereby make adjudicative enforcement easier for 
the FTC.  
Well-designed rules could resolve many pertinent issues in 
cybersecurity. They could close the gap in federal regulation 
of data security by extending regulations to all institutions, 
not just discrete sectors of the economy. They can also promote 
data breach prevention rather than self-flagellating 
disclosures.136 Establishing these rules would allow the FTC 
to transform the advisory information within its online best 
practice guides137 and various consent decrees into legally 
enforceable regulations. The Commission can grow the teeth 
it needs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The staggering data breach statistics and costs of identity 
theft highlight the gaps in federal cybersecurity regulation 
and the need for improvement. Many other countries have 
responded and so have states—even if their efforts have 
created a growing thicket of compliance standards. The FTC 
is doing what it can through adjudication, but employing its 
rarely used rulemaking authority can increase its regulatory 
efficacy. Consumers need protection, and the consumer 
protection agency has the tools to provide it. 
 
 
136 See O’Connor, supra note 10. 
137 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 102. 
